The Role of Loan Guarantee Schemes in Alleviating Credit Rationing in the UK by Cowling, Marc
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Role of Loan Guarantee Schemes in
Alleviating Credit Rationing in the UK
Marc Cowling
Institute for Employment Studies
30. January 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1613/
MPRA Paper No. 1613, posted 5. February 2007
 1 
The Role of Loan Guarantee Schemes in Alleviating 
Credit Rationing in the UK 
 
JEL Classifications: D45, G21, L14 
 
Marc Cowling 
Institute for Employment Studies 
Brighton BN1 9RF 
England 
 
ph: 00 44 (0) 1273 873299 
E-mail: marc.cowling@ies.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract 
It is a widely held perception, although empirically contentious, that credit 
rationing is an important phenomenon in the UK small business sector.  In 
response to this perception the UK government initiated a loan guarantee scheme 
(SFLGS) in 1981.  In this paper we use a unique dataset comprised of small firms 
facing a very real, and binding, credit constraint, to question whether a corrective 
scheme such as the SFLGS has, in practice, alleviated such constraints by 
promoting access to debt finance for small credit constrained firms.  The results 
broadly support the view that the SFLGS has fulfilled its primary objective. 
 
* The author would firstly like to thank the Department of Trade and Industry for the data and 
general support.  In addition the extended comments of Ed Greenberg and Bruce Petersen, 
Washington University, Colin Mayer, Oxford University, Andrew Oswald and Keith Cowling, 
Warwick University, Robert Cressy, City University and Simon Parker, Durham University have 
improved the paper immensely.  I thank them all. 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
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A common concern raised in the small business literature is that capital market 
imperfections exist and limit the availability of finance to small firms.  Such 
concerns have led to the widespread use of loan guarantee programmes 
throughout the developed and developing world.  Almost without exception this 
type of intervention in the capital market has sought to provide loan security to 
smaller firms who would not otherwise be able to obtain debt finance through 
conventional means (Riding,1998). 
 
In this paper we use a unique dataset comprised of borrowers who, in the absence 
of the loan guarantee scheme (SFLGS), would be perfectly rationed in the debt 
capital market.  That is to say that they have been refused all potential sources of 
debt finance at the time of SFLGS loan application.  Thus our explicit research 
question is whether the existence of a loan guarantee scheme has fulfilled its 
primary objective of alleviating capital constraints to smaller firms.  A particular 
innovation in our data is that we have information concerning ex post loan 
default.  This is particularly important for the credit rationing debate as default 
represents what Astebro and Bernhardt (1999) call a type 1 error.  That is to say 
that banks made the correct decision in the first instance not to lend to the firm in 
the absence of the loan guarantee.  By contrast, SFLGS loans which are 
successfully repaid would, in the absence of the SFLGS, represent a missed 
opportunity for the bank.  This would be termed a type 2 error by the previous 
authors.  Broadly speaking if default increases as constrained firms become 
unconstrained via the loan guarantee, then banks are, under certain conditions, 
better off without a scheme.  This occurs as loan guarantees raise the equilibrium 
price and volume traded in the market. 
 
The associated literature on credit rationing essentially deals with lenders 
response to risk. For example, size of firm is often taken to be a good proxy for 
firm risk, as is age of firm.  Whilst both may be true in a wider sense, it is also 
true that within each size and age category of firm there is a distribution of risk 
across firms within that group.  Riding (1998) is definitive on this point and 
indeed argues that ‘in no case have such objectives of risk subsidisation been 
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articulated for loan guarantee schemes,’ and further that,’ the objective is to assist 
small firms, not to subsidise risky firms.  It is the task of the credit markets to 
discriminate according to quality of borrower.  It is the objective of the loan 
guarantee scheme to facilitate capital formation for small firms.’ 
 
This leads us into the key issue surrounding the rationale for loan guarantee 
schemes, that of credit rationing.  The existence or otherwise of credit rationing 
which is not based on borrower quality is fundamental to the requirement for a 
corrective scheme such as the UK’s Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme 
(SFLGS) as it exists in its present form1.  In short to justify the continuation of an 
SFLGS, it must be the case that small firms cannot gain access to (proportionally) 
as much credit, or credit on equally favourable terms, as larger firms of equal 
risk. 
 
The subject of credit rationing itself has been the focus of a considerable body of 
theoretical work.  Yet as Thakor (1989) points out the notion of a credit rationing 
equilibrium where banks are competitive ‘has baffled economists for a long 
time’.  The reason for this difficulty can be articulated using a basic demand-
supply framework.  Quite simply, if there is an excess demand for bank funds (i.e 
more firms want loans than banks are currently prepared to supply at the 
governing market price) then theory implies that banks should raise loan price 
(the interest rate) to equate demand for loans with supply, thus increasing profits.  
We know from the evidence on small firm loan refusal rates that in the normal 
course of bank lending this does not happen (Cambridge,1996, Cowling,1998, 
Levenson and Willard, 1997, Storey,1997).  The question is why banks refuse to 
lend to some firms. 
 
The common thread that ties much of the literature together is the role that 
information plays in the small firm - bank relationship.  On this, the seminal 
credit rationing paper by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argues that borrower quality 
is ex ante undetectable by the lending bank (termed adverse selection). By 
                                                          
1 Similar rationales have been articulated for the US SBA Loan Guarantee Program and Canadian 
schemes. 
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implication this gives the firm an unfair advantage over the bank.  De Meza and 
Southey (1996), by contrast, argue that banks, due to their extensive experience 
of small business lending, are well informed and efficient processors of 
information. A second problem under this sort of information problem (termed 
moral hazard) would be one where the borrower responds to an upward 
movement in interest rates (cost of borrowing) by switching his funds to a riskier 
project.  For the bank the implications are such that its expected profits are in fact 
lower than was the case before it raised the interest rate.  Here it is optimal for 
the bank not to raise its interest rates to clear the credit market as it suffers 
through lower profits due to firms choosing higher risk projects.  In a second 
paper on this theme, Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) develop their work to give a time 
dimension to the small firm - bank lending relationship.  Here banks deny credit 
to any borrower who has defaulted on a previous loan.  Assuming that borrowers 
know this bank strategy, the implications are that borrowers are induced to 
always choose the safest project with the lowest probability of failure. 
 
So where does collateral fit into the debate?  A number of theoretical papers 
(Besanko and Thakor, 1987, Bester, 1985) have argued that collateral can act as a 
sorting device.  By this we mean that only good risk borrowers will be willing to 
put up collateral against a loan as they feel confident that they will not default 
and lose their assets.  Bad borrowers, knowing that they are risky, are very 
reluctant to offer collateral against borrowing as they have a higher probability of 
losing it.  In this type of framework offering collateral also has implications for 
the cost of borrowing.  For example, a good borrower who offers collateral to the 
bank will be compensated with a lower interest rate.  A bad borrower, unwilling 
to offer collateral, will pay a high interest rate.  In this type of regime banks 
separate out borrowers by risk type by the nature of the contracts they accept, 
even in the presence of asymmetric information.  This is where the first 
divergences begin to appear in the credit rationing debate. Bester op cit argues 
that  bringing collateral into the credit market can eliminate credit rationing.  
Besanko and Thakor op cit argue the opposite.  Their case is founded upon the 
possibility that in cases where the good and bad borrowers are sufficiently 
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different in terms of their riskiness, the amount of collateral required from good 
borrowers may well exceed their wealth (asset) endowment.  Thus a proportion 
of genuinely good, low risk, borrowers are unfairly credit rationed.  This sort of 
credit rationing would be prima facie evidence in support of loan guarantee 
schemes. 
 
Taking this line of debate a little further, and bearing in mind the evidence of the 
effects of gifts and inheritances on the probability of starting a business (see for 
example, Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998, Holtz-Eakin et al, 1994, Lindh and 
Ohlsson,1996) we can consider a regime in which there are ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ 
borrowers.  This concept is particularly important in the light of the comment of 
Hanson (1983) who in relation to the US argues that; 
 
“entrepreneurial talent is not the prerogative of the wealthy, but is broadly 
distributed throughout the population as a whole.  Without reasonable access to 
financing, many of our countries’ most talented and aggressive entrepreneurs will 
be cut out of the economic system.  Innovation and business development will 
become a luxury reserved for the wealthy, and the economy as a whole will 
suffer.” 
 
Once again we turn to the ongoing work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1987).  Here they 
again show that borrowers can be rationed in equilibrium, and importantly even 
those with low risk probabilities.  This once again would be a cause for concern 
and support the hypothesis of unjustifiable credit rationing.  Having briefly 
reviewed the core theoretical issues in relation to credit rationing, one might 
conclude  that in situations where information is asymmetric, it can be quite 
rational for banks to ration credit.  Yet we have also seen that under certain 
conditions good borrowers can be denied access to credit.  In summary we turn to 
a quote from Thakor op cit, “Credit rationing is probably a more complex 
phenomenon than even current models suggest.  It is virtually impossible for 
static models to allow full comprehension of the rich tapestry of factors that 
interact to determine a banks decision to ration credit.”  In line with our 
discussion on the theoretical controversies surrounding credit rationing and its 
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implications, the empirical evidence is equally diverse.  Historically, the earlier 
empirical evidence on the existence or otherwise of credit rationing was often set 
in a macroeconomic context.  The most common testable hypothesis was whether 
loan rates were ‘sticky’.  By stickiness we mean that the response of bank lending 
margins to changes in base rates is not instantaneous, or not equivalent. 
 
Empirically, the early work of Jaffee(1971) and Goldfeld (1966), both of whom 
tested the speed of adjustment on commercial loan rates compared to open 
market rates, found that adjustment was slow, implying credit rationing.  More 
recent work by Slovin and Sushka (1983) found that the speed of adjustment was 
at least two quarters, although they argue that this is tantamount to instantaneous 
adjustment.  Others who provide evidence supporting credit rationing are King 
(1986), although results are not conclusive, and Sofianos, Wachtel, Melnik 
(1990) who found evidence for credit rationing, albeit only for commitment 
lending (that is lending the bank has agreed to allocate to the firm over a 
specified period should the firm require those funds). 
 
The most important work to use microeconomic data to test theories of credit 
rationing was that of Berger and Udell (1992), who analysed over one million 
individual loans in the US over the period 1977 to 1988.  Their results on loan 
rate stickiness show that bank margins (defined as total interest rates minus the 
treasury rate) are sticky with respect to shifts in nominal treasury rates with a 
bank margin elasticity of  -0.34.  Thus bank margins are highly and negatively 
correlated with treasury rates over time.  At this point the evidence is consistent 
with credit rationing.  Yet Berger and Udell also employ a further series of tests 
to establish the validity of this finding.  Here they adopt what they term the 
‘proportions tests’, defined as how the proportion of loans with different contract 
features vary with credit market tightness.  For example, the probability that a 
given loan will be under commitment, secured, or be floating rate.  On 
commitment lending, for credit rationing to be supported the proportion of new 
loans made under commitment should increase substantially when treasury rates 
rise.  The collateral test requires that more loans are collateralised when treasury 
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rates rise.  This occurs as firms who do not pledge collateral when rates are low, 
shift to collateralised lending when rates are high. 
 
Empirically, Berger and Udell using their proportions test for commitment 
lending find that a doubling of nominal rates of interest reduces the proportion of 
commitment loans by 1 percent.  This is the opposite sign required for credit 
rationing to be supported.  On the collateral test they find that the probability of 
collateralised lending increases when treasury rates rise.  This evidence broadly 
supports the credit rationing hypothesis.  Finally, they examine the floating rate 
test and find a small decrease in the probability of floating rate loans when 
treasury rates rise.  On the basis of all the evidence presented they conclude that 
commercial loan rates are sticky, which is consistent with credit rationing as 
found by previous studies.  Yet the incorporation of a host of other contract terms 
generally negates this initial finding.  The notable exception to their rejection of 
the notion that credit rationing is a significant macroeconomic phenomenon is 
their result concerning collateral. 
 
This paper is intended to follow as closely as our data permits in the footsteps of 
the key empirical work of Berger and Udell (1992) for the US by using a unique 
individual loan level dataset.  However, we also present a number of innovations 
which may help shed more light on the real world significance of credit rationing.  
In particular we have information on whether an actual loans ends in default.  
Further, we can distinguish between start-up businesses and those already 
trading.  Both of these variables were unavailable to Berger and Udell and many 
previous studies.  Yet they provide us with much more explicit tests of credit 
rationing thanhas been possible before.  In the former case we can identify 
whether banks charge higher loan rates for riskier (i.e defaulting) loans which 
would indicate no rationing and market clearing.  In the latter case we would 
expect start-up businesses to suffer the most from information based problems 
and thus be the most rationed.  These key variables are discussed subsequently.  
In addition we use data for the UK and for a more recent time period, 1993-1998.  
The dataset is comprised of some 27,331 loans which represent the total set of 
SFLGS loans issued over this period. 
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In line with previous macro and micro level studies we find that loan stickiness is 
an important feature of loan contracting in the UK as it is in the US.  For our 
observed stickiness there are several alternative explanations, including credit 
rationing, implicit interest rate insurance and loan recontracting by banks and 
existing customer firms.  Given the sample period is one of relatively strong and 
stable macroeconomic growth for the UK in the post-1991 recession period, we 
give less credence to the loan recontracting explanation as this primarily deals 
with existing firms experiencing financial distress during periods of economic 
instability or downturns.  Regarding implicit interest rate insurance, once again 
there are some problems that may cast some doubt on the validity of this 
explanation, not least the fact that some 43% of loans were issued to new firms.  
The implicit interest rate insurance explanation effectively applies only to repeat 
borrowers. 
 
We proceed by adopting the empirical approach of Berger and Udell in an 
attempt to shed more light on the extent or otherwise of credit rationing as a real 
world phenomena in the UK.  In doing so we seek to differentiate credit rationing 
from an array of alternative explanations for observed loan rate stickiness.  Most 
importantly we provide a detailed empirical examination of how different loan 
contract features impact on loan rates.  This is supplemented by a series of 
‘proportions tests’ which provide more explicit tests of various loan contract 
theories relevant to credit rationing. 
 
The rest of the paper is set out as follows;   Section II describes the nature of the 
dataset to be used in our empirical analysis.  In addition we briefly outline the 
specific tests adopted originally by Berger and Udell.  In Section III, we present 
our empirical findings.  We conclude in Section IV. 
 
 
II. Data and Empirical Tests 
The data is derived from the complete records for loans issued under the UK 
Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme over the period 1993 to 1998.  In total this 
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represents 27,331 individual loan contracts.  These are spread over some 35 
banks and financial institutions throughout the UK, although the vast majority (in 
the region of 80%) are issued by the four major UK clearing banks.  The scheme 
requires that each borrower completes a standard form before the loan is issued.  
These forms are collated centrally by the Department of Trade and Industry and 
include data on a host of key features of the borrower firm, the specific loan 
contract terms and the bank issuing the loan.  Table 1 provides a description of 
each variable used in the empirical analysis. 
 
As can be observed margins are of the order of 3.25% over base, although the 
spread is rather large peaking at 9.75 over base.  It is worth noting here that for 
some firms such usurious rates refuse to put them off borrowing.  In addition only 
one in three loan contracts involve the posting of assets by the borrower as 
opposed to solely government guarantee.  Further, of the 27,331 loans issued 
some 20% resulted in default.  This information is one of the key innovations in 
our dataset which can potentially shed some important insights into the issue of 
credit rationing. 
 
Empirical Tests of Loan Rate Stickiness 
The ‘stickiness tests’ adopted by Berger and Udell are fairly straightforward in 
that the bank margin (the dependent variable) is regressed against real and 
nominal interest rates, the key loan contract variables and a measure of 
macroeconomic circumstance.  Allowing for non-linearity’s in the term structure 
of interest rates, the key independent variables are the exogenously determined 
interest rate (denoted baserate in nominal terms and realbase for real terms) and 
the appropriate squared terms (denoted baserate2 and realbase2).  Where we 
differ from Berger and Udell is that we omit a measure of credit market tightness 
(their CRUNCH variable) as our sample period only covers a period which could 
not plausibly be viewed as one in which banks might be actively reducing funds 
available for lending.  In short our sample period is one in which UK 
macroeconomic performance was characterised by moderate and stable (i.e low 
inflationary) growth.  However, this aspect of our data does present a potential 
problem in that credit rationing, if observed, is most likely to be present when 
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banks begin to tighten their lending in response to unfavourable changes at the 
macroeconomic level. 
 
Table 1 
Data Used in the Empirical Analysis 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Definition 
bmargin 27331 0.0325 0.01057 0.0025 0.0975 Bank margin 
over base 
baserate 27331 0.0616 0.00545 0.0525 0.0800 Bank of 
England base 
rates 
realbase 27331 0.0342 0.00502 0.0245 0.0455 Base rates 
deflated by 
price index 
commit 27331 0.4277 0.49476 0 1 Coded 1 if 
loan is under 
commitment 
float 27331 0.6314 0.48241 0 1 Coded 1 if 
loan is 
floating rate 
collateral 27331 0.3043 0.54141 0 1 Coded 1 if 
borrower 
pledges 
collateral 
years 27331 4.8335 1.86461 0 10 Loan term in 
years 
loan 27331 36827.18 43650.2 500 250000 Loan amount 
in £s 
new 27331 0.43437 0.49568 0 1 Coded 1 if 
firm age<2 
years 
default 27331 0.20006 0.40005 0 1 Coded 1 if 
loan 
defaulted 
grgdp 20 0.03076 0.09419 0.00307 0.04965 Real GDP 
growth 
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As to the relative merits of using nominal or real interest rates, the use of real 
rates is arguably more in keeping with theoretical models of credit rationing 
which by implication is a real macroeconomic phenomenon.  However, most 
empiricists have tended to use nominal rates, in part due to the difficulties 
surrounding the necessity of adopting appropriate empirical methods of 
addressing inflationary expectations.  Given that our results may differ 
substantially between real and nominal interest rates, we tread very carefully at 
this stage.  Empirically, Berger and Udell used rational expectations and adaptive 
expectations models and found little differences between the two.  They also 
noted that by using nominal rates they could avoid most measurement errors.  In 
the real world we probably do not have enough information on whether economic 
agents react more to changes in nominal or real variables, particularly prices.  
This is hardly surprising given the substantial degree of retail and factor price 
rigidity evident in the UK economy.  Finally we note that even nominal rate 
stickiness can be indicative of credit rationing. 
 
In keeping with Berger and Udell, we use contemporaneous interest rates to 
reflect the fact that lenders (banks) are responding to current conditions at the 
time of loan application.  In short our model allows us to test whether, in 
equilibrium, banks raise (lower) their loan margins in line (i.e equally) with 
increases (decreases) in open market rates or whether rationing occurs.  Thus we 
largely ignore periods of disequilibrium when banks might be adjusting to 
changes in macroeconomic circumstance.  In the real world we typically observe 
that banks adjustment of mortgage rates to changes in open market rates is 
virtually instantaneous. 
 
From our basic stickiness regression, we augment the models by incorporating a 
series of interaction terms, notably commit, collateral and float with our interest 
rate measures in order to establish whether key contract terms have substantially 
different degrees of stickiness.  The commit variable denotes loan contracts in 
which the borrower is contractually insured against credit rationing, although 
survey evidence in the UK suggest that even these types of contractual insurances 
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can be obviated by the inclusion of loan withdrawal clauses (see for example, 
Binks et al, 1996, Cowling, et al ,1991).  These effects aside, and in a world 
characterised by informational asymmetries, we might expect that commitment 
loan rates would be less sticky than non-commitment rates. 
 
Collateral is an extremely important issue for us given the nature of our data.  
SFLGS loans require that all available assets which could be used to securitise a 
conventional bank loan must have been exhausted.  The loans issued in our data 
set which do have some element of personal or firm security reflect that the loan 
package includes a non-SFLGS loan which runs alongside an SFLGS loan.  For 
those loans with no collateral attached this means that the borrower has no assets 
to pledge as collateral as far as the bank can ascertain.  From the previous 
literature, we note that collateral is more often than not associated with riskier 
loans (Cowling,1998), although even this rather intuitive assumption has been 
challenged on theoretical grounds by Chan and Thakor (1987). Collateral is also 
typically identified as a means of addressing informational asymmetries (Leeth 
and Scott,1989).  On balance there are arguments to support relative loan rate 
stickiness on collateralised and uncollateralised loans.  Similar arguments can be 
put forward for relative stickiness between floating and fixed rate loans primarily 
associated with risk sharing and sorting arguments. 
 
 
Proportions Tests 
Here we present a discussion of the three core ‘proportions tests’ adopted by 
Berger and Udell.  Essentially the test are designed to elicit more information 
concerning the relative stickiness of loans with different, and very specific, 
bundles of contract parameters.  For example, is a loan under commitment with 
collateral pledged more sticky than a loan not under commitment with collateral 
pledged?  The three tests are comprised of estimating a probit model of the 
probabilities of a loan contract being; (i) under commitment, (ii) collateralised, 
and (iii) floating rate.  Given our sample size we are able to estimate all three 
models by individual observation.  In addition, and in line with the initial 
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stickiness tests, we estimate each proportions test using real and nominal interest 
rates, and employ the same set of control variables. 
 
The commitment test provides an explicit test of the significance of credit 
rationing.  For credit rationing to be quantitatively significant in the UK the 
results must show definitively that new loans issued under commitment increase 
with open market rates.  Empirically our probit results must identify a positive 
and significant coefficient on our interest rate variables.  This occurs as 
commitment borrowers are contractually insured against rationing in a way that 
non-commitment borrowers are not.  Thus we would expect to observe a 
reduction in non-commitment borrowing in periods of macroeconomic instability.  
If this occurs, then it follows that the relative proportion of commitment loans out 
of total loans will rise. 
 
The collateral and float tests enable us to identify how borrowers with varying 
contractual terms are more (less) likely to be rationed.  In particular the role of 
collateral when open market rates are increasing will shed more light on the role 
that information asymmetries play for secured and unsecured borrowers, and how 
collateralisation might resolve such problems.  For fixed rate borrowers increases 
in open market rates clearly put them in a relatively favourable position vis a vis 
borrowers with variable rate lending.  However, the reverse is also true when 
open market rates are falling. 
 
In all our empirical models we use a number of control variables to take account 
of additional loan specific, macroeconomic and bank specific factors which were 
they omitted might otherwise lead us to draw some unsafe conclusions.  
Specifically we include loan duration, loan size, legal status of the borrowing 
firm, bank dummies, a dummy for new firms, and real growth in GDP as a proxy 
for macroeconomic activity.  These are all variables which have commonly been 
used in previous empirical studies and tend to reflect factors which might play a 
key role in helping the lender to assess borrower type.  Finally we include a 
variable ‘default’ which identifies individual loans which were, ex post, not 
repaid for reasons of legal default.  Default is identified by a call for guarantee 
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repayment on the UK Treasury by the lending institution.  This particular 
variable is our key innovation over the original Berger and Udell study and 
provides us with a pure test of credit rationing in the sense that defaulting firms 
in a non-credit rationing regime should have higher margins than non-defaulters.  
In a regime where credit rationing was evident defaulting loans should have 
sticky margins (see Riley,1987). 
 
 
III. Empirical Results 
 
Stickiness Test Results 
We report the results of our stickiness tests for real and nominal rates of interest 
in Tables 2 and 3.  In both cases the bank margin is regressed against (real or 
nominal) interest rates, loan contract, macroeconomic and bank variables.  For 
reasons of focus and parsimony we suppress the control variables in our reporting 
of the results but include our key default, commitment, collateral and float 
variables.  The regression shown in column 1 of Table 2 has the real interest rate 
on the right hand side (realbase) and its squared term (rbase2), the commitment, 
collateral and float variables together with the previously identified control 
variables.  We observe that both real interest rates and the squared term are 
empirically significant but of opposite signs.  Importantly the former is positively 
correlated with bank margins and the latter negatively which strongly supports 
the notion of non-linearity’s in the interest rate structure. 
 
Of vital importance to the credit rationing debate is whether bank margins are 
sticky.  In fact they move in line with base rates initially but the magnitude of the 
coefficient on the squared term ensures that for most non-negative real interest 
rates the overall effect is negative.  For example if we calculate the predicted 
change in bank margins for a doubling of real interest rates from its mean value 
of 3.425 to 6.85, then we estimate that bank margins will fall by 76.34 basis 
points.  This represents a significant degree of stickiness in loan rates.  Repeating 
the calculation for nominal interest rates (shown in column 1 of Table 3) we find 
that a doubling of nominal rates from their sample mean of 6.16 to 12.32 gives a 
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predicted fall in bank margins of 108.88 basis points.  Thus the measured 
stickiness of nominal rates is substantially larger than that on real rates.  
Somewhat reassuringly the results are broadly in line with those reported by 
Berger and Udell, although a little higher than theirs of 59 and 99 basis points 
respectively for a doubling of real and nominal rates. 
 
We now turn our focus of attention to relative stickiness for loans with different 
contract features.  Here we faithfully adhere to the estimation of Berger and Udell 
by including three interaction terms, com-float, com-fixed, and noncom-float 
which are interacted with realbase and identified as rb-com-float, rb-com-fixed 
and rb-nocom-float.  In a similar vein we simply replace rb with br to reflect the 
cases where nominal interest rates were used.  The base category which is 
excluded from the regressions is nocom-fixed which permits us to identify 
different rates of stickiness across different types of loan contract terms. 
 
 Definitions of Contract Parameter Interaction Terms 
Interaction Term Definition 
com-float floating rate loan under commitment 
com-fixed fixed rate loan under commitment 
nocom-float floating rate loan not under commitment 
nocom-fixed fixed rate loan not under commitment 
 
The results in column 2 of Table 2 shows that commitment loans have virtually 
identical stickiness to non-commitment loans for given rate type.  However, they 
are far less sticky than the coefficients identified in the US study.  The results 
also strongly suggest that fixed rate loans are far more sticky than floating rate 
loans.  In fact the coefficient on commitment lending at fixed rates is significant 
and negative which also implies that fixed rate non-commitment loans are less 
sticky.  The equivalent regression for nominal rates is presented in column 2 of 
Table 3.  Here we find contrasting results.  In particular we note that stickiness 
across all loan contract terms is greater than was apparent for real interest rates.  
Once again however, we find that non-commitment and commitment loans of 
comparable rates are of equal stickiness.  Yet in this case we also find that 
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commitment loans with fixed rates are less sticky then their variable rate 
equivalents and more sticky than the control group of non-commitment fixed rate 
loans. 
 
The finding that stickiness on commitment loans is identical to that on non-
commitment loans of the same rate type accords with the findings of Berger and 
Udell for the US, and implicitly questions whether the association of stickiness 
with credit rationing is as robust as previously believed.  Crucially the use of 
commitment loans insulates the borrower from credit rationing.  On balance our 
results might imply that information asymmetries are not the fundamental 
determinant of rate stickiness. 
 
The regression results shown in column 3 of Table 2 simply substitute in 
collateral for our commitment variables in all the interaction terms.  Firstly we 
find that fixed rate loans are stickier than their variable rate equivalents.  The key 
finding is that secured loans are more sticky than unsecured loans and 
substantially so on variable rate loans.  This might imply that borrowers pledging 
collateral are subject to greater information problems than those who do not.  
Furthermore, even the pledging of collateral cannot fully negate such problems.  
These results also hold across our real and nominal rate regressions and appear of 
similar magnitude. 
 
Finally we can use our ex post default variable to examine loan rate stickiness 
with respect to borrower risk in the vein of Riley (1987) who predicts that should 
rationing be empirically observed it should be most prevalent amongst the 
highest risk classes of borrower.  In our case we have observed in real time which 
borrowers have defaulted on their loans and can trace this back to the point of 
loan issue.  Thus we might expect to observe more stickiness amongst our 
defaulting loans should credit rationing be empirically significant.  In fact only in 
our real interest rate regressions were defaulters found to pay higher bank 
margins.  Yet even this result suggests that the highest risk class of borrowers 
(the defaulters) have less sticky margins than safer borrowers (non-defaulters).  
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These findings appear to contradict Riley’s model with greater robustness than 
was apparent in the earlier Berger and Udell study. 
 
In keeping with Berger and Udell we offer one final piece of evidence concerning 
loan rate stickiness by referring to the raw data on bank margins (see Figs 1a 
,1b).  Here we observe that banks, without exception, never lend at rates below 
the prevailing market rate.  In fact the lowest bank margin recorded was 0.25 
over base.  This evidence is consistent with banks earning a non-negative 
expected profit on each individual loan if we assume that bank margins are 
sufficient to cover expected losses incurred through default.  In fact earlier 
estimation of banks net revenues from the SFLGS indicate that large positive 
profits were earnt over the full sample period (see KPMG,1999).  In this respect 
the data are consistent with credit rationing theory, although alternative 
interpretations are plausible2. 
 
At this juncture we find a reassuring degree of consistency with the earlier US 
work of Berger and Udell in terms of our overall results.  Like the previous 
authors we also find a significant degree of stickiness, but on further, more 
detailed examination of loan contract terms we also broadly support their 
conclusions that observed stickiness does not necessarily equate to credit 
rationing.  In particular our results vis a vis commitment lending offer strong 
evidence against the case for credit rationing.  However, this is counteracted to a 
degree by the large and positive profits earnt from the loan pool by banks and the 
lack of below risk free borrowing costs.  If we return to the cause of our 
empirically observed stickiness, we note that our findings support the view that 
the greater share of stickiness cannot be attributed to information problems as 
evidenced by the equality of stickiness on commitment and non-commitment 
loans.  Further, we also note that loans issued to new firms are substantially less 
sticky than those issued to existing firms.  This finding appears to strengthen the 
case against informational problems causing loan rate stickiness for without 
doubt new firms with no track record are far more likely to be subject to this type 
of problem when dealing with financial markets.  In fact one might rationally 
                                                          
2 I thank Colin Mayer for this observation. 
 18 
expect that if credit rationing did exist at any significant level in the UK it would 
be at its most prevalent amongst new borrowers/firms.  This does not appear to 
be the case. 
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Table 2 
Regressions of Bank Margins (bmargin) on Real Interest Rates, Loan Contract Terms and 
Controls 
Variable Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
realbase 1.220 9.069 0.5575 4.207 0.579 4.396 
rbase2 -2.288 -11.777 -1.917 -10.131 -1.977 -10.487 
rb-com-
float 
  0.6723 27.239   
rb-com-
fixed 
  -0.0686 -2.445   
rb-nocom-
float 
  0.6753 28.395   
rb-col-
float 
    0.477 18.754 
rb-col-
fixed 
    -0.027 -0.896 
rb-nocol-
float 
    0.799 37.472 
commit -0.0346 -3.543   -0.0296 -3.131 
collateral -0.0611 -4.736 -0.0430 -3.423   
float -1.5258 -155.04     
com-float   -3.858 -45.167 -3.209 -36.436 
com-fixed   0.2134 2.168 -0.0058 -0.055 
nocom-
float 
  -3.841 -46.702 -4.295 -57.978 
default 0.0235 2.095 0.0285 2.610 0.0257 2.369 
new 0.3953 39.27 0.4064 41.480 0.401 41.067 
R2 0.522  0.547  0.551  
F stat 1754.7  1576.8  1598.8  
 
 
Table 3 
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Regressions of Bank Margins (bmargin) on Nominal Interest Rates, Loan Contract Terms and 
Controls 
Variable Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
baserate -0.805 -4.082 -0.814 -4.274 -0.715 -3.758 
baserate2 0.0327 2.061 0.0044 0.029 -0.109 -0.711 
rb-com-
float 
  0.695 31.266   
rb-com-
fixed 
  -0.0492 -1.975   
rb-nocom-
float 
  0.7043 33.156   
rb-col-
float 
    0.5916 25.956 
rb-col-
fixed 
    0.0708 2.630 
rb-nocol-
float 
    0.819 42.602 
commit -0.0382 -3.931   -0.0325 -3.473 
collateral -0.0655 -5.102 -0.0795 -6.024   
float -1.5209 -154.912     
com-float   -5.837 -42.461 -5.199 -37.047 
com-fixed   0.280 1.1811 -0.5308 -3.157 
nocom-
float 
  -5.858 -44.654 -6.599 -55.408 
default 0.00696 0.621 0.0072 0.668 0.0594 0.551 
new 0.3931 39.217 0.400 41.395 0.396 41.027 
R2 0.525  0.499  0.561  
F stat 1780.8  1516.8  1661.2  
 
In terms of answering our fundamental research question as to whether the 
existence of a loan guarantee scheme has alleviated a binding credit constraint 
faced by a subset of smaller firms in the UK, the results thus far are generally 
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supportive in the sense that there is little evidence of further credit rationing once 
firms are on the scheme.  By implication the SFLGS must be seen as an 
important and corrective scheme that broadly fulfils its objectives, those of 
promoting access to finance for small firms with ex ante viable lending 
propositions.  In its absence it is likely that credit rationing would be rather more 
prevalent than it is in the UK. 
 
 
Proportions Tests Results 
In Table 4 we report the results of our three proportions tests using real interest 
rates on the right hand side.  Table 5 shows the equivalent results when using 
nominal rates.  The dependent variables in each of the three cases are coded in 
binary form [1,0] indicating that an individual loan is either under commitment, 
collateralised, or floating rate (coded 1) or not under commitment, not secured, or 
fixed rate (coded 0).  The remaining right hand side variables are identical to 
those used in the stickiness regressions with the omission of the interaction terms.  
The estimation in this case uses a probit model to reflect the nature of the 
dependent variables and in each case the marginal effects estimates are also 
calculated.  Column 1 of Tables 4 and 5 show the results concerning the 
probability that a given loan will be under commitment as a function of real and 
nominal interest rates.  For credit rationing to be a significant real world 
phenomenon it must be the case in these two models that the probability of a loan 
being under commitment rises with open market rates.  In fact we observe in both 
cases that the reverse is true.  Here the probability of a loan being issued under 
commitment declines by 0.81% for a 1% increase in real or nominal rates 
respectively when evaluated at their means.  This might imply that rationing is 
most prevalent on non-commitment loans.  A further issue is whether this finding 
offers evidence that is inconsistent with information based rationing. 
 
We now turn our focus of attention to the collateral tests reported in column 2 of 
Table 4 and Table 5.  Here we observe that the probability of a loan being 
secured declines by 0.15% for a 1% increase in real open market rates.  The 
magnitude of the downward shift in the probability of loan collateralisation is 
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even greater for nominal interest rates at -0.34% for an equivalent 1% increase in 
nominal rates.  These results are of surprisingly similar magnitude (and sign) to 
those of Berger and Udell.  In terms of their implications, they confirm our earlier 
stickiness results regarding collateral in that borrowers who pledge collateral are 
typically those most likely to be subject to information problems even after they 
have pledged security.  As such we might conclude that where rationing does 
occur it is most likely to fall upon secured than unsecured borrowers. 
 
Next we turn to our third proportions test, that relating to the probability that a 
given loan will be floating rate as opposed to fixed rate.  These results are 
reported in column 3 of Table 4 and Table 5 respectively.  Using real interest 
rates we find that the probability of a floating rate loan increases by 0.35% for a 
given 1% increase in real rates.  The equivalent figure for nominal rates is 1.32% 
(for a 1% rise in nominal rates).  These sorts of results strongly reject the implicit 
interest rate insurance hypothesis given that offering fixed rate loans is a far more 
effective way to insulate borrowers from deteriorating macroeconomic conditions 
and high open market rates. 
 
Regarding loan defaulters, we note that riskier borrowers are equally likely to be 
offered commitment loans and unsecured loans, although they were marginally 
more likely to be offered floating rate loans in the models using real open market 
rates.  In the equivalent nominal rate models we find that defaulters are slightly 
less likely to be offered commitment loans, equally likely to be offered unsecured 
loans and once again more likely to be offered floating rate loans.  For new firms 
we note that they have a 39% lower probability of being offered commitment 
loans, a 2.8% lower probability of being offered an unsecured loan and a 3.4% 
higher probability of being given a floating rate loan using real market rates.  On 
nominal rates we find identical effects. 
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Table 4  
Probit Estimates of Probability of Different Loan Contract terms on Real Interest Rates and 
Controls 
 Commit  Collateral  Float  
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  
realbase -2.082 -8.511 -0.473 -1.491 0.942 3.833 
rbase2 3.046 8.618 0.526 1.146 -1.491 -4.205 
commit   -0.11 -4.859 0.150 8.383 
collateral -0.168 -7.198   0.089 3.751 
float 0.144 8.054 0.0516 2.185   
new -1.075 -61.987 -0.0857 3.659 0.093 5.048 
default -0.031 -1.516 0.0345 1.312 0.050 2.440 
Pseudo R2 0.127  0.0466  0.104  
Chi-sq 4758.69  15642.11  3765.24  
 
Table 5  
Probit Estimates of Probability of Different Loan Contract terms on Nominal Interest Rates and 
Controls 
 Commit  Collateral  Float  
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  
baserate -2.074 -5.743 -1.051 -2.280 3.558 9.860 
baserate2 1.707 5..859 0.752 2.000 -2.934 -10.084 
commit   -0.112 -4.862 0.152 8.515 
collateral -0.168 -7.213   0.0902 3.778 
float 0.146 8.197 0.054 2.287   
new -1.072 -61.897 -0.085 -3.646 0.0957 5.195 
default -0.0397 -1.923 0.025 0.953 0.0597 2.881 
Pseudo R2 0.127  0.466  0.106  
Chi-sq 4758.69  15649.33  3841.12  
 
IV. Conclusions 
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This paper has empirically examined the extent to which information-based, 
equilibrium credit rationing is prevalent amongst small business customers of 
financial institutions in the UK over the period 1993 to 1998.  By adopting the 
methodology of an important earlier US study, that of Berger and Udell, we are 
able to provide comparable results for another country by focusing on specific 
features of loan contracts which have direct implications drawn from theory.  In 
addition we are able to add a number of key innovations, in particular the use of a 
variable which captures subsequent loan default. 
 
Our key empirical results and their implications for credit rationing are presented 
in Table 6.  Our first finding is consistent with the majority of previous studies in 
that we also find a substantial degree of stickiness on bank margins with respect 
to open-market rates.  This much is consistent with credit rationing, perhaps more 
so than in earlier studies given the large number of loans issued to new firms who 
by implication cannot be distressed borrowers or recontracting borrowers.  
However, when we examine specific loan contract features we find a much 
greater degree of consistency with the results of Berger and Udell, particularly 
with respect to the equality of stickiness across commitment and non-
commitment loans.  Despite this comparability between many of our results and 
theirs, we also find evidence that tends not to favour the implicit interest rate 
insurance hypothesis as an alternative explanation for what we observe.  On some 
tests we also find evidence generally supportive of credit rationing.  For example, 
the lack of non-negative bank margins and the collateral results in particular.  
Without doubt our findings generally support the notion that borrowers who 
pledge collateral are the most problematic in an information sense for banks and 
are probably the riskiest type of borrowers.  However, the reverse is true if we 
consider loan defaulters who are very unlikely to be rationed and more likely to 
be offered loans at higher rates to reflect their riskier status.  This is strong 
evidence is favour of rejecting credit rationing as a significant phenomenon. 
 
Perhaps the final piece of evidence to decide which side of the fence we fall on 
relates to the commitment loan proportions test.  Here the fact that the probability 
of a loan being made under commitment decreases with real and nominal open-
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market rates is very strong evidence against credit rationing.  This is crucial as 
only non-commitment borrowers can be rationed.  However, the role that loan 
withdrawal clauses might play may mitigate some of the essential theoretical 
arguments vis a vis commitment lending and rationing.  We conclude that on 
balance credit rationing is not an explanation consistent with the loan market for 
most small businesses in the UK.  However, there is a pool of small firms who, 
due to informational problems, will always find it more difficult to raise funds 
from the credit market when macroeconomic conditions are worsening, even 
when collateral is available. 
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Table 6 
SUMMARY OF KEY EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
Result Implication 
A. Stickiness Tests 
1. Bank margins are sticky and fall substantially as 
open-market rates rise. Stickiness is greater on 
nominal rather than real rates. 
Generally supports credit rationing theory.  Also 
could be explained by implicit interest rate 
insurance or recontracting with troubled 
borrowers, although both these explanations are 
less likely given the large proportion of new 
borrowers. 
2. Commitment loan rates equally as sticky as non-
commitment rates. 
Observed stickiness cannot be attributed to credit 
rationing since commitment loans cannot be 
rationed. 
3. No negative margins. Banks make substantial 
net profits from their portfolios over the entire 
sample period. 
Consistent with credit rationing in the sense that 
banks expected profits are non-negative. However, 
the role that the government backed guarantee 
plays in reducing the banks cost of default cannot 
be ignored. 
4. Fixed rate loans stickier than floating rate loans. Consistent with implicit interest rate insurance 
hypothesis. 
5. Loans which subsequently end in default (the 
highest risk class of borrowers) have less sticky 
margins than safer risk classes of borrowers. 
Inconsistent with credit rationing of the Riley 
(1987) type. 
6. Secured loans are stickier than unsecured loans. Consistent with credit rationing as collateral is 
associated with higher risk borrowers and 
information problems. 
B. Proportions Tests 
1. Commitment loans decrease with increases in 
real and nominal open-market rates. 
Inconsistent with credit rationing as only non-
commitment borrowers can be rationed. 
2. Loan collateralisation decrease with open-
market rates. 
Consistent with credit rationing of riskier 
borrowers. 
3. Fixed rate loans decline with open-market rates. Strongly rejects implicit interest rate insurance 
hypothesis. 
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Figure 1a. Bank Margins and Real Interest Rates 
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Figure 1b. Bank Margins and Nominal Interst Rates 
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